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Andrew Kimbrough 
/ want my learned readers to participate in the scene I am about 
to replay; I want them to examine its every detail and see for 
themselves. . . . 
—Humbert Humbert in Nabokov's Lolita. 
The vilification of the pedophile in the closing decade of the twentieth century 
has created a rather bizarre and galvanizing moment in recent North American 
history, one in which feminists and gay rights activists find themselves aligned 
with conservative family advocates in their condemnation of the North American 
Man Boy Love Association. 1 At a time when academics and social critics 
unanimously bemoan the impossibility of a workable and just notion of community 
in our economically and racially divided, relativistic and multi-hyphenated society, 
the panic engendered by the malevolent image of the child molester has united the 
American public in an unforeseen way. The phenomenon has created a consolidated 
community of outrage which includes people of every age, race, political persuasion 
and personal practice. With the slight exception of the pedophile. 
The novelty of Paula Vogel's How I Learned to Drive (1997) is its successful 
attempt to reconcile the exclusion of the pedophile by creating a model of 
community that is radically inclusive of contemporary society's last great pariah. 
One would think this task not too difficult given that the American public has been 
nurturing a love affair with movies and television (and sometimes theatre) that 
have been sympathetically portraying murderers, drug dealers, pornographers and 
psychopaths for several decades now. Still, as the dearth of scripts seriously dealing 
with the subject of children and sex indicates, Paula Vogel transgressed accepted 
practice when she presented the alcoholic pedophile, Uncle Peck, not as an 
antagonist at all, but as someone who is complex, compassionate and sincerely 
attentive of his niece, albeit deeply in need of help. It's not as though Vogel's play 
is subversive; critics and audiences understand exactly what Drive is all about. 
Donald Munro of the Fresno Bee echoed the sentiments of many reviewers when 
he wrote, 
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Pedophilia used to be considered a taboo subject, but in today's 
talk-show-soaked climate, the sexual abuse of children has 
become a hot topic. What's still taboo, however, is to depict the 
pedophile as anything but a one-dimensional, smoldering sack 
of evil. It's still taboo to depict the relationship between the abuser 
and the abused as just that: a relationship, no matter how twisted 
and wrong it might be . 2 
Writing in Detroit, Michael Margolin agreed, observing, "In the end, the greatest 
appeal of How I Learned to Drive is that it has the ring of truth. In life, victims are 
not always blameless, and perpetrators are not just villains. Vogel's play casts the 
plumb line on that truth." 3 
But as we are constantly reminded, truth is relative. On the other side of the 
critical fence were the responses that seemed more in keeping with the moral 
certitude expressed in the "talk-show-soaked climate" that has informed recent 
knee-jerk legislation aimed at both pedophiles and the NEA. In Los Angeles, 
Rebecca Baldwin regarded Drive as "a play that celebrated pedophilia" while in 
Long Beach, G. B. Loganbill felt that "this play's theme was repulsively revolting."4 
Of course it is the rare play that does not have its detractors, but my task here 
is not to reconcile disparate and conflicting opinions. I simply wish to point out a 
paradox. In the play, L'il Bit revisits a past of incest and abuse in order to overcome 
her personal demons, advocating a reinvestment in such notions as "family and 
forgiveness," two values far from unfamiliar to mainstream American mores. While 
the play never condones pedophilia, its benevolent regard for Peck indirectly reflects 
the American belief, inherited from Enlightenment thought, that every human being 
is created equal, innocent until proven guilty, and deserving of due process, a belief 
that slumbers at the heart of the U.S. Constitution and is from time to time discerned 
in U.S. judicial practice. How I Learned to Drive simply promotes what the 
Constitution aims to guarantee and secular humanism endorses, that Uncle Peck, 
and by extension all pedophiles, be afforded all the rights of a lawful citizen and 
regarded as one among equals. It should be no surprise that Drive, despite its few 
naysayers, has earned the Pulitzer Prize—its sentiments reflect the principles which 
lie at the heart of our social psyche. The paradox is betrayed by the fact that in the 
face of such noble ideals we still insist on scapegoating a portion of our society as 
unredeemably degenerate and therefore expendable. 5 
The problem may be that we, a collective of relatively progressive modernists 
made up of differing politics, ethnicities and nationalities yet beholden to one another 
by the fragile civility of common courtesy, really do not believe and therefore 
refuse to espouse the ethics we have created for ourselves. We may indeed thirst 
for the blood of sacrificial scapegoats and are bound to indulge in practices that 
preclude true, inclusive community. Or it may be that we are suffering from a 
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communal malaise made up of irrational fears and feelings of estrangement which 
we seek to vent on whomever we can consider evil, and the ideal community is 
still out there waiting to be attained once we have found a way to heal and readjust. 
While stopping short of claiming a definitive solution to a persistent problem, this 
essay forwards an argument that Paula Vogel's How I Learned to Drive offers a 
model of community that is profoundly ethical and operable because it is radically 
understanding and inclusive of those whom we identify as different and undesirable. 
Vogel is not content, however, to recycle the tired cliches and platitudes of moralistic 
works that oversimplify the excruciating problematics and ambiguities of the human 
condition by appealing to cheap sentiment. 6 Her play sidesteps the naive notion 
that difference is bridged when we simply choose to emphasize sameness, 
compassion, and fellow feeling. Rather, her play testifies to the radical and self-
implicating belief that community begins when we recognize that what we find 
most abhorrent and intolerable in others is really that which we find most fearful 
and shameful about ourselves. 
1. The Dysfunctional Community 
Critics and audiences do not need to be reminded that the past two decades 
have witnessed a sharp rise in the awareness of perceived sex crimes against children 
and the propagation of the unquestioned belief that such crimes are on the rise. 
How I Learned to Drive appeared at a time when versions of California's "Three 
Strikes" ruling and New Jersey's "Megan's Law," passed in the wake of two grisly 
child abduction murders, became federally mandated. 7 Coincidentally, in the decade 
preceding the publication of Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita (1955), the novel Paula 
Vogel credits for being the inspiration of her play, 8 approximately half of the United 
States passed new legislation aimed at sex crimes against children and women. 9 
As it turns out, Vogel's and Nabokov's work have more in common than just a 
sympathetic pedophile. Both texts are insightful social commentaries on what 
America chooses to frame as epidemics and crises, and also on what it chooses to 
ignore. Such a coincidence is not lost on Philip Jenkins, whose study Moral Panic 
(1998) points out that the recent child sex abuse panic is the third such panic in the 
past century alone, the first occurring in the 1910s and the second during the 1930s 
and 40s. Unfortunately, Jenkins does not foresee an end to the cycle any time soon. 
For some reason we seem to be addicted to our proclivity for creating hysteria and 
passing legislation. 
Symptomatic of the manufacture of panic is our unawareness that this 
practice constitutes a problem. Jenkins believes that, whereas recent studies of the 
two previous sex crime panics recognize their constructed nature as reflective of 
social fears that have little to do with crime, scholarship that focusses on the 1980s 
and 90s does not apply the same skeptical criteria. 
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The consensus is that although earlier panics arose from 
ignorance, hysteria, and self-interest, contemporary formulations 
of child abuse are sober depictions of objective truth. . . . In 
neither our conceptualizing of the problem nor our devising of 
counter-measures is there much evidence of our having learned 
from history. 1 0 
Jenkins equates the "sex psychopath statutes" of the 1910s and 1940s with recent 
legislation such as "Megan's Law" in that they were passed under public pressure 
and contained elements likely to invoke constitutional challenge. 1 1 He observes 
that sex laws in the past failed to fulfill a genuine social need and were ultimately 
repealed, and he foresees a similar fate to the sex laws of the 1990s, predicting that 
they will acquire a "malodorous historical reputation." 1 2 He has not had to wait 
long. Joe Klaas, grandfather to Polly Klaas, after whose murder California's "Three 
Strikes" ruling was drafted, published an editorial in The Los Angeles Times on 
August 25, 1999, less than five years after the law's passage, complaining that it 
did not address the problem for which it was intended. 1 3 
Jenkins' assertion is not that sex crimes are not a problem (which he admits 
they are) but that the public conception of sex crime does not address crime at all, 
arguing that it is more indicative of "the concerns, prejudices, and fears of the 
society that thus defines its deviants and outsiders," providing "an index of shifting 
social attitudes to matters as diverse as the status of children, the structure of the 
family, the range of acceptable sexual behaviors, and the tolerance of alternative 
sexual orientations." 1 4 He also shows that concepts regarding sexuality have never 
been constant, and that new legislation in every era has been marked by the 
incorporation of questionable contributions from the evolving (and often equivocal) 
fields of psychiatry, medicine, and the social sciences. 1 5 Jenkins implies that much 
of our problem with perceived sexual abuse stems from our not knowing exactly 
how we feel about our own sexuality. 
When Paula Vogel wrote her play she was aware that the public discourse 
on child sexual abuse had reached a level of absurdity. As she noted in interviews, 
she was consciously working against the victimization and blame mentality that is 
too often reflected in our culture's media . 1 6 Instead, she investigates a problem 
without offering easy solutions while at the same time raising difficult questions. 
One such question addresses the notion of changing concepts of sexuality and 
propriety, not as products of social evolution, but as indicative of our own 
discomforts. Vogel juxtaposes her teenaged lead, the precocious and curious L'il 
Bit, a relative sexual innocent despite her unique circumstances, against her 
grandmother, a woman who "grew up during the Depression" and who had a child 
bride at the age of fourteen. The difference between the two illustrates that today it 
is practically criminal to consider a woman of fourteen as sexual while earlier in 
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the century, as Grandma asserts, "It was legal, what Daddy and I did! I was fourteen 
and in those days, fourteen was a grown-up woman." 1 7 Given the contemporary 
social climate, such legality appears arcane; but as Jenkins points out, in the first 
decades of the century five southern states still set the age of consent at ten years 
and Delaware's stood at seven years . 1 8 Vern Bullough reminds us that throughout 
history up until the first half of the twentieth century, brides in their early teens 
were commonplace, 1 9 a fact not lost on Lolita's Humbert Humbert, whose hero, 
Edgar Allen Poe, married his thirteen year old cousin at the age of twenty-seven in 
1836 . 2 0 Yet even though ages of consent rose slowly in the past hundred years, 
today there is still no consensus. The age of consent for girls in Canada stands at 
fourteen, while most states locate consent between sixteen and eighteen. Jenkins 
claims that in the U.S. today sexual activity is permitted in girls as young as twelve 
or thirteen. 2 1 Lil Bit's family illustrates the conflicting pressures cultivated by 
North American culture: on the one hand is Grandpa, who believes that women are 
at best breeding machines and who sexualizes his adolescent granddaughter at 
every opportunity; on the other hand is Grandma, who would prefer to shelter her 
children from all sexual knowledge until they are married. 
In light of the figures, it is not ironic that Peck could molest his niece when 
she was eleven but remain determined to wait until she was eighteen before 
attempting intercourse. The notion of sexual boundaries in both a historical and 
contemporary regard has always been a more relative than fixed matter. Only 
recently has society deemed to conflate the sexuality of children and adolescents. 
As Jenkins observes, the word pedophilia, as it is currently employed, denotes 
sexual contact between an adult and anyone under the age of eighteen, when quite 
literally pedophilia is defined as an attraction to pre-adolescent children, usually 
under the age of twelve. The word which refers to the attraction to adolescent 
youths is ephebophilia, which also describes the attraction Peck has for L'il Bit, 
since at the age of eleven she had already developed breasts. The point is that 
ephebophilia is not considered as transgressive as pedophilia, and therefore not as 
attractive and useful to a public discourse that aims to inflame rather than dispel 
hysteria and misinformation. 2 2 Vogel skated within the narrow boundaries of our 
collective discomfort when she presented her "victim" as a prescient teenager aware 
of her budding sexual allure, engaging in an incestuous relationship that is in reality 
one step removed from incest (Peck is her uncle by marriage, not by blood), and 
not strictly pedophilic. Except for the early instance of molestation, L'il Bit and 
Uncle Peck mirror the real life example of Woody Allen and Soon Yi Previn, who 
are at this date married and raising a child together. Although their case may violate 
notions of good taste, their actions have been within the law. Nonetheless, while 
questions of legality and propriety reflect our shifting discomforts with sexuality, 
they do not adequately account for the persistent and prurient allure and 
demonization of pedophil ia. 2 3 
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Taking on everything from the sensationalized trials of Polly Klaas's and 
Megan Kanka's killers to the Menendez brothers and Michael Jackson, from child 
beauty pageants and advertising to the "teacher sex scandals," James R. Kincaid in 
his study Erotic Innocence (1998) argues that "we are all implicated in a 
contemporary discourse on children, sexuality, and assault so mighty that it comes 
close to defining our moment." 2 4 He proposes a theory that American society has 
created its own myth of the child molester, what he calls a "story" that the public 
feels compelled to propagate. He begins the construction of his argument with two 
assumptions. 
The first is that these stories are doing something for us: we 
wouldn't be telling this tale of the exploitation of the child's 
body if we didn't wish to have it told. The second is that what 
these stories do for us is keep the subject hot so we can disown it 
while welcoming it in the back door. 2 5 
In no uncertain terms, Kincaid accuses the American public of an attraction to the 
image of the eroticized child, an image it at once creates while at the same time 
condemns. 2 6 Given such a construction, Kincaid sees only a proliferation of sex 
scandal stories and the concomitant fallacy that sex crimes against children are on 
the rise when evidence points to the contrary, that adult sexual behavior with minors 
and children occurs less frequently now than it did in the past . 2 7 
The appearance of How I Learned to Drive on stages across America at a time 
when child sex abuse hysteria was (and may still be) on the rise begs the question 
of whether Paula Vogel was simply capitalizing on the popularity of the story or 
doing something to address its viral nature. Two issues might serve to compromise 
its position. First, cropping up in the play is the familiar notion that Uncle Peck is 
a victimizer because he himself was a victim of abuse, an oft-repeated "fact" which 
psychologists Randall Garland and Michael Dougher find unsupportable. After 
reviewing the available studies, which Garland and Dougher found to have poorly 
defined methodologies and a high variability of findings, they believe the abuser/ 
abused hypothesis "inadequate and incorrect." 2 8 Second, even more questionable 
is the portrayal of a large-breasted lead (who, judging from production stills, is 
always played by an attractive actress) who is herself an adult even though she 
plays a teenager, thus providing the audience with a less troublesome and more 
accessible experience of her four or five sexualized encounters with her uncle. 
Epitomizing such an experience is the scene of the photo shoot during which 
occurs, if the production follows the suggestion of the script, the projection of 
images "a la Playboy, Calvin Klein and Victoriana/Lewis Carroll's Alice Liddell." 2 9 
Though the play unquestionably aims to challenge the production of sexualized 
female imagery, the imagery is nonetheless provided and may be therefore 
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interpreted or enjoyed according to the individual sensibilities of the audience 
members. Furthermore, since we do not actually see a thirteen year old but an 
attractive adult pose provocatively for her uncle, a layer of emotional disturbance 
is removed and, possibly, replaced by a titillating sexual voyeurism. Vogel may 
have unintentionally provided a means for us to condemn pedophilia while at the 
same time indulge our erotic tas tes . 3 0 
But I do not believe such challenges to the play or Vogel's intentions holds up 
against the view, already affirmed by the critical response to the play, that Drive 
takes on, as do Jenkins and Kincaid, the faulty and misleading image of the pedophile 
as produced in both the media and the popular public conception. In the face of 
such a powerful and self-perpetuating story Kincaid proposes to, and I think Vogel 
succeeds in, startling those stories out of currency with the goal of providing a 
more realistic, balanced and ethical consideration of the problem of child sexual 
abuse. Kincaid believes that the best way to escape the trap of "scapegoating porn-
speak" is to replace the old stories with new ones, by in fact frankly admitting, 
"Yes, we all feel the attractiveness of children." He does not shy from stating, "I 
believe most adults in our culture feel some measure of erotic attraction to children 
and the childlike; I do not know how it could be otherwise," but such an admittance 
does not mean that he fears anyone will then feel compelled to have sex with 
children. On the contrary, he simply wonders whether we are doing ourselves more 
harm by displacing our anxieties instead of confronting our constructions of the 
eroticized child. 3 1 
David Savran considers the photo shoot the center of the play because it 
graphically represents L'il Bit's objectification, for her uncle as well as herself. 
Savran echoes Kincaid's social analysis when he argues that L'il Bit "suddenly 
discovers that she has become an actor in a drama that has been scripted for her by 
an exploitative, if well-meaning spectator who is, in turn, the product of a society 
that values women for their a l lure ." 3 2 In Kincaid's view, however, it is a society 
that prefers children for their allure, possibly more so than women, and everyone 
is implicated in the exploitation. The originality of Vogel's play stems from its 
attempt to break the cycle. This is accomplished when individuals identify when 
and how they are objectified. Like L'il Bit, they can then learn, as Savran observes, 
to "re-member" and "reconstruct" themselves, taking control of their lives and 
offering positive examples for others . 3 3 Kincaid argues that the cycle can also be 
broken when individuals learn they are doing the objectifying. 3 4 My belief is that 
when the audience focusses on L'il Bit, they are in part unwittingly standing in 
Uncle Peck's shoes, gazing at her through the lens of the camera. They are 
uncomfortable not because L'il Bit is sincerely enjoying herself while her lascivious 
uncle is snapping away, but because they are the ones manipulating the camera 
and the child. 
Kincaid believes that an admittance of culpability is a way out of the trap. 
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Ironically, it is not Peck who has this realization, but L'il Bit. Even though she is 
read as the victim and protagonist of the piece, when she revisits the scene of the 
crime with the intention to recognize and confess her own complicity, she takes 
responsibility for a past for which she, as a child, could not have had responsibility. 
As part of the process of her growth and healing, such an admittance and acceptance 
of culpability is a very real and empowering way in which L'il Bit breaks the 
cycle. Paula Vogel is aware that "the most crucial forgiveness would be L'il Bit's 
forgiving L'il Bit. L'il Bit as an adult looking at and understanding her complicity." 3 5 
By admitting that she has become part of the problem, she can then take steps to 
overcome the problem. Paula Vogel reflected this sentiment when she stated, 
We live in a misogynist world, and I want to see why. And I 
want to look and see why not just men are the enemy but how I 
as a woman participate in the system. . . . At the moment, we 
women are colluding with the patriarchal system and with the 
class structure. You can't deport the enemy, the enemy is inside 
u s . 3 6 
Kincaid agrees, proposing a refocus of attention on ourselves as the source of 
difference as aslialegy tu addiesvlheyioblemuf the scapegoating of the pedophile. 
It is my belief that an understanding of the history of this dilemma 
and a shift in our focus will cause us not only to see differently 
but to know differently. From altered forms of knowing can come 
new actions and new feelings about actions we take. In this 
case, I think we can find a happy paradox: by locating the 
problems within our common heritage—that is to say, within 
ourselves (and giving up on the monsters)—we will find it in 
our hearts (and in the way we see the problem) to be easier on 
ourselves and, consequently, easier on our children. 3 7 
2. The Mimetic Community 
The paradox of the crisis surrounding the pedophile in contemporary American 
society makes sense when viewed through the paradigm of Rene Girard's mimetic 
theory. 3 8 In summary, the mimetic theory posits that a primary impulse in a human 
being is a mimetic rivalry that aims to possess what is perceived as desirable by an 
other, a rivalry that escalates into violence and death. As a result, communal 
safeguards in the form of sacrificial rituals have developed as a means to keep 
violence safely channeled and controlled, providing for the safe and peaceful 
maintenance of society as opposed to an otherwise free reign of chaos. Girard 
interprets all of human civilization as practicing ritual sacrifice in order to secure 
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its survival against the threat of latent violence, believing that "humanity's very 
existence is due primarily to the operation of the surrogate vict im." 3 9 The role of 
the surrogate is central to the process, since the victim acts as a substitute for all 
the members of the community, who project onto the surrogate both communal 
and individual tensions, rivalries and hostilities. Victimization may be random or 
deliberate, but victims are always scapegoats, usually chosen from groups perceived 
as outsiders, different or transgressive, and not necessarily guilty of the crimes for 
which they are sacrificed. Instead, every individual of the community puts to death 
with the surrogate that which it hopes to purge from within itself, making of the 
victim a "monstrous double" of the self. 4 0 
While the scapegoating mechanism and ritual sacrifice serve to maintain 
community, such practices are not necessarily healthy, since the history of 
humankind has been marked by cycles of barbarity and destruction that can only 
be attributed to a self-perpetuating system that will never rid itself completely of 
the violence it aims to expel. In the case of enlightened, industrialized societies 
that naively believe they have rid themselves of ritual forms reminiscent of primitive 
and superstitious religious practice, the scapegoating mechanism operates 
completely unrecognized, having become sublimated to the degree that sacrifice 
operates under the more civilized cloak of world war, genocide, and localized 
forms of vigilante jus t ice . 4 1 Girard argues that the unique value of Christianity, 
indeed the essence of its promise of salvation, is the denial of the sacrificial impulse 
in favor of a radical embrace of love and non-violence 4 2 Unfortunately, humanity 
has been so conditioned by mimetic rivalry and the belief in the efficacy of sacrifice 
that such an extreme ethic, although universally applauded and idealized, is believed 
impractical. Hence, given that our modern society rationally condemns sacrifice 
for what it perceives as barbaric behavior, we remain blind to our perverse sacrificial 
practice of scapegoating elements of our own population. We have substituted 
sacrifice with forms of retributive justice or blatant persecution, vainly attempting 
to exorcize the pariah from among us, not from within us. 
Girard formulated his theory after a close scrutiny of classic literary texts, 
seeing in them veiled sublimations of mimetic rivalry and sacrifice. In similar 
fashion, the scapegoat principle operates within How I Learned to Drive. Even 
though Uncle Peck is not identified as a pedophile by his own community and 
does not experience public humiliation and punishment, in the world view of the 
play he is identified as a malevolent element that disrupts and imperils community, 
and there is no alternative for him but to die. The play elevates Peck to the status of 
tragic hero—in Girard 's reading a sacrificial victim—in keeping with the 
mythological formula of the Greek tragedies, a parallel that Vogel intentionally 
stages by surrounding her two leads with a "Greek Chorus," three actors who play 
all of the other characters. But Uncle Peck does not occupy the center of the play. 
Significantly, How I Learned to Drive breaks from the traditional affirmation of 
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sacrifice seen in tragedy when it presents Peck's transgression and tragic fate as 
secondary to L'il Bit's more crucial attempt to come to terms with her own 
complicity in a past of blame, guilt, and abuse. 4 3 
The play opens with L'il Bit making a simple declaration: "Sometimes to tell 
a secret, you first have to teach a lesson." 4 4 One beguiling aspect of the play is that 
L'il Bit never explicitly identifies that secret, since a shroud of ambiguity obscures 
her attitude toward the events. Certainly she reveals one secret by presenting the 
complicated history of sexual activity that she experienced with her uncle. But she 
could be pointing to a secret of abuse she received at the hands of her family and 
schoolmates, as well as to the secret of her sexual orientation. Another possibility 
may simply be found in what is implied in the end, that L'il Bit has forgiven the 
abuses of her past and she now prepares to get on with her life. But if these are the 
secrets, what could be the lesson? What could L'il Bit desire to teach that is not 
already implied in her secret? I believe that in order for L'il Bit to communicate a 
secret about abuse and forgiveness to an audience predisposed to judgement and 
scapegoating, she first has to demonstrate a radical breaking with the cycle of 
violence and victimization. Throughout the entire play, L'il Bit never condemns or 
blames her uncle. Instead, she embarks on a journey of empathetic identification 
with the one person who undoubtedly did her a great deal of harm, taking the form 
of his monstrous double, and finding forgiveness for him once she has located the 
transgression within herself 4 5 
Throughout the play, L'il Bit presents herself as a teenage girl who in some 
respect harbors an awareness that she is implicated in an inappropriate relationship 
with her uncle. At the age of eleven she had already internalized the notion that "I 
can certainly handle Uncle Peck" 4 6 whereas the entire play starkly and sadly affirms 
the contrary. Nonetheless, even after her initial experience of abuse in the first 
driving lesson (which we see only at the end of the play), L'il Bit offers to take 
responsibility for caring for her uncle's troubled emotional life in the kitchen scene 
of her thirteenth Christmas. By the time she is sixteen L'il Bit understands that a 
relationship with Peck that involves even a hint of romantic undertones is "not 
nice to Aunt Mary," 4 7 but regardless of that knowledge, in the very first scene of 
the play, when seventeen year old L'il Bit and Peck are alone together in the car, 
we know that the relationship has evolved if not along romantic then certainly 
physical l ines. 4 8 
In the language of contemporary "pop psy" psychobabble, we witness a 
representation of role reversal between an adult and a child, in which the child in a 
naive and exploited manner is made to play the parent to the adult. As conventional 
wisdom dictates, the child is unquestionably an innocent, by no means adequate to 
the task, and can not be made to accept responsibility for her actions. Vogel 
undermines this conception when she surrounds L'il Bit with dysfunctional family 
members who are more unaware of their own complicity in abuse than either Peck 
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or L'il Bit. The three generations of women in L'il Bit's family portray the cyclical 
nature of the transference of responsibility, exhibiting their unwitting participation 
in an inheritance of abuse and violence. Grandma was an unwilling child bride 
who still believed in Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny at fourteen while her older 
husband, Big Papa, forced her to have sex at least three times a day. Despite Big 
Papa's voracious sexual appetite, repression in the house was nonetheless so strong 
that L'il Bit's uninformed mother Lucy became a pregnant teenager forced to marry 
a dead-beat Dad who ended up leaving his family after a year. When Grandma 
eludes responsibility for Lucy's unwanted teenage pregnancy, she tells her, "I hold 
you responsible!" 4 9 The claim is ironic given that Lucy accuses her mother of 
failing in her responsibility to teach her about men and sex. But Lucy does not 
learn from the incident and she readily quotes her mother when she does not want 
to take responsibility for eleven year old L'il Bit spending seven hours alone in a 
car with Uncle Peck, especially when she suspects Peck of an unhealthy attraction 
towards her daughter. In a graphic representation of repetition, Lucy tells L'il Bit, 
"If anything happens, I hold you responsible." 5 0 
Vogel questions whether we really believe that our children are not responsible 
for their actions with adults, or if we would rather not admit, our self-assuring 
"pop psy" proclamations aside, that we see our children as rivals to our peace of 
mind, preferring to paint them as scapegoats for our own failures. As a second 
example, Aunt Mary's confessional monologue drives the point painfully home. 
In a vulnerable moment alone on stage, Mary takes the audience into her confidence 
and reveals herself as deeply concerned for her husband's well-being, even though 
she has been obviously ill-equipped to deal with his problems. As she remarks 
twice, "I know he has troubles. And we don't talk about them." But in a gesture 
that risks shattering audience sympathy, she abruptly turns on the heroine of the 
play, saying, "And I want to say this about my niece. She's a sly one, that one is. 
She knows exactly what she's doing; she's twisted Peck around her finger and 
thinks it's all a big secret." 5 1 The statement comes across as a shock not only 
because it comes from L'il Bit's aunt, but because it is the audience's first indication 
that anyone has suspected foul play between L'il Bit and Peck. But caught within 
a process of mimesis, Mary is unable to assess the situation clearly and falls into 
the trap of seeing her niece as a rival to her husband, in effect blaming the victim 
for her husband's pathology. Instead of summoning parental love and compassion, 
she gives in to an outburst that typifies the violence that is the rival's only response, 
even though the rival is blood kin. 
As an adult L'il Bit has come to learn that the cycle of deferred 
responsibility and denial of complicity has got to be broken. Her well-being dictates 
that she must escape the trap of blaming and scapegoating another for her own 
mistakes and misdeeds, no matter how excusable they may seem. The task does 
not promise to be easy, especially in light of what she has lost—a family and a life 
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"in her body," as well as precious formative years that can never be regained. 5 2 
Given the option of just and acceptable retribution, forgiveness becomes a radical 
gesture. For L'il Bit to step outside of herself for a moment to consider, "Who did 
it to you, Uncle Peck? How old were you? Were you eleven?" 5 3 empowers her to 
put aside her own pain in order to consider the pain of another, thereby ending a 
cycle of violence she had inherited from her family. Of course Peck is dead at this 
point, but L'il Bit's gesture does not simply aid in her healing and help her creatively 
reform community, it brings Peck into the community as well. Her embrace of 
Peck is intentional, reflected in her confession, 
Sometimes I see my uncle as a kind of Flying Dutchman. In the 
opera, the Dutchman is doomed to wander the sea; but every 
seven years he can come ashore, and if he finds a maiden who 
will love him of her own free will—he will be released. 5 4 
This release is precisely what L'il Bit offers. Instead of hate or blame she replies 
with love. The noble gesture exemplifies the only response anyone can make who 
is at all committed to transformation and an end to violence. 
A more direct illustration of L'il Bit's coming to terms with her relationship 
with her uncle transpires during her "long bus trip to Upstate New York ." 5 5 At the 
age of twenty-eight, after Peck had been dead three years, and ten years since she 
saw him last, L'il Bit allows herself a sexual liaison with a young man whom she 
does not believe when he claims to be a senior in high school. As she notes in an 
aside, "The light was fading outside, so perhaps he was—with a very high voice." 
In essence, L'il Bit identifies herself as the transgressive other when she decides t o 
engage in behavior identified with her pedophilic uncle—having sex with a minor, 
someone under the age of consent . 5 6 However, it is unlikely that many in the 
audience would understand this particular implication of the scene. We never hear 
his age, only that he says he is a senior in high school. L'il Bit neither confirms nor 
denies his age, but elliptically says "perhaps he was." The statement is intentionally 
ambiguous, but what further buffers audience reception of a sense of transgression 
is the persistent sexist notion that it is acceptable and encouraged in American 
culture for boys to experiment sexually at a young age, but not g i r ls . 5 7 Accordingly, 
this particular scene is written to be viewed as a coming of age moment for the boy 
while framed as a revelatory moment for L'il Bi t , 5 8 and the transgression L'il Bit 
commits gives her the ability to understand Peck in a way left inaccessible by 
judgement and condemnation. In a radical identification with her uncle, she reverses 
the doubling process by locating within herself the transgression normally projected 
onto the scapegoat. As a result, she has an embodied experience that communicates 
to her. 
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I lay on my back in the dark and I thought about you, Uncle 
Peck. Oh. Oh—this is the allure. Being older. Being the first. 
Being the translator, the teacher, the epicure, the already jaded. 
This is how the giver gets taken. 5 9 
In her quest to understand her uncle, she learns to recognize the ephebophile/ 
pedophile within her. She learns that nothing human is alien to her, and the alien 
lives within. 
It may be that most of us are unwilling to take L'il Bit's journey, which is why 
audiences find the catharsis provided by a play like How I Learned to Drive so 
gratifying. Then again, as Girard might argue, many of us may be unable to admit 
our own transgressions, and instead we continue to create doubles and scapegoats, 
like Nabokov's Humbert Humbert who suffers delusions that he is pursued by a 
nemesis, Clare Quilty. In the context of the novel, Quilty is Humbert's creation 
and both men are the same, the difference being that Humbert transfers all of his 
pedophilic leanings onto his fictitious antagonist, whom he finally murders for 
having kidnapped Lolita—the crime for which Humbert alone is guilty. 6 0 Whereas 
Vogel's work is a meditation on forgiveness, Nabokov's is a parody, aimed to 
implicate the reader in Humbert's pathetic solipsism and narcissism. Nabokov was 
aware that as his readers enjoyed the graphic, though technically "clean," depictions 
of sexualized teenaged women, were they to condemn Humbert for his pedophilia, 
they would have to recognize their condemnation of themselves. As L'il Bit learns, 
Humbert Humbert is everyman. 
3. The Ethical Community 
None of the ethical implications of this essay are substantially new. The 
humanist ideals which we have seen reiterated by such differing writers as James 
Kincaid, Rene Girard, and Paula Vogel form the bedrock of our western civilization. 
The belief that humankind would benefit greatly were it to stop scapegoating and 
persecuting others for perceived differences is hardly revolutionary. To note that 
we nonetheless seem doomed to indulge violence while at the same time demand 
its eradication falls short of enlightening. All of it has been said before, and yet 
nothing seems to change—at least not fast enough. For this reason one can more 
readily understand why four influential thinkers of the late twentieth century, 
Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francoise Lyotard, and Jean-Luc Nancy, 
share the one belief that an acceptable, ethical response to the violence and difference 
in our postmodern world must come from outside of the systems of language and 
knowledge we currently employ. Everything so far, they believe, has proved 
woefully inadequate. 
Were we to accept the hypothesis of the wholesale failure of the Enlightenment 
project, we may be tempted to agree that universal justice is impossible and ethical 
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thinking, in demand now more than ever, is in a state of crisis. To her credit, Julia 
Kristeva does not follow her French compatriots down rhetorical alleys that hope 
to locate ethical agency outside of language structures altogether. In Strangers to 
Ourselves (1991) she revisits ancient Greek, Hebrew, Pauline, Renaissance and 
Enlightenment thinking in order to remind us that the disparate roots of western 
civilization have always advocated an inclusion of strangers and foreigners, 
regardless of whether such inclusion has been practiced. Applicable to our era, 
Kristeva points to The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) as 
sufficient in its principle, though not necessarily in its content, to guarantee a 
universal dignity that safeguards every individual a freedom from terror. 6 1 In this 
light, Kristeva may be aligned more with Americans Richard Rorty and Todd May 
who eschew the fixation on insurmountable difference in favor of a recognition of 
sameness and who discount the stalemate of post-structural relativity in favor of 
pragmatic praxis. 6 2 Kristeva differs with Rorty and May, however, in that she sees 
difference as a recurrent theme because it remains a persistent problem. 
The ethical tack that Kristeva proposes in Strangers shifts the focus away 
from the foreigner altogether and refocusses on the self as the significant site of 
difference. The work opens with a consideration of the self and the other that is 
highly reminiscent of Girard's reflection of the self in the monstrous double: 
Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of 
our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which 
understanding and affinity founder. By recognizing him within 
ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself. A symptom 
that precisely turns 'we ' into a problem, perhaps makes it 
impossible, the foreigner comes in when the consciousness of 
my difference arises, and he disappears when we all acknowledge 
ourselves as foreigners, unamenable to bonds and communities. 6 3 
Unfortunately, neither Girard nor Kristeva have commented upon each other's 
work, but that they reach similar conclusions should not be altogether surprising. 
Although Kristeva does not acknowledge the mimetic theory as such, she shares 
Girard's agreement with one of Freud's propositions, that violent behavior in 
individuals be interpreted as the projection out of the self "what it experiences as 
dangerous or unpleasant in itself, making of it an alien double, uncanny and 
demoniacal." 6 4 On the other hand, that Kristeva receives more critical attention 
for her philosophic work is understandable, given Girard's impatience not only 
with psychoanalysis but with contemporary critical thought altogether. 6 5 More 
important, as Girard himself admits, his sense of an ethics of love and non-violence 
based completely upon Christian faith simply will not find approbation in a 
secularized world. 6 6 
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However true this last point may be, it indicates the double bind theorists 
face. Given a polyglot and multicultural world, secular and religious, there is no 
ready recourse to one system of thought, despite how close one system may come 
to offering what seems a workable solution for the hostilities between all parties 
involved. Surely no serious thinker can easily disparage such universally appealing 
ideals as love and non-violence, despite Girard's claim that the problem to be 
overcome is not thought but behavior The endeavor to formulate and practice a 
universal code of ethics, then, may only succeed after what will no doubt prove to 
be painstaking and often bumbling and failing attempts to establish world peace 
and safeguard human rights. Kristeva posits that a solution, a "middle way" between 
totalitarianism and anarchy, presupposes two considerations, the first being a 
national balancing of the status of citizens and foreigners, the second a recognition 
of the "strangeness" of every individual. 
There must be an ethics, the fulfillment of which shall depend 
on education and psychoanalysis. Such an ethics should reveal, 
discuss, and spread a concept of human dignity, wrested from 
the euphoria of classic humanists and laden with the alienations, 
dramas, and dead ends of our condition as speaking beings. 
Individual particularistic tendencies, the desire to set oneself up 
as a private value, the attack against the other, identification with 
or rejection of the group are inherent in human dignity, if one 
acknowledges that such a dignity includes strangeness. 6 8 
Vogel precisely stages such a therapeutic process, what Kristeva calls "a 
journey into the strangeness of the other and of oneself, toward an ethics of respect 
for the irreconcilable." 6 9 In Drive, the pedophile is not a generalized evil that can 
safely be ostracized as an anonymous, transgressive other. Instead, the other is 
made radically the same. Peck is one of us. He lives in our families, eats at our 
tables, and cares for our children. To confront the particular disturbance of Peck is 
not to confront the evil of the other, but to confront the evil in oneself. L'il Bit 
leads her audience on a journey of violation and healing in which they confront 
their own pedophilic and transgressive natures in a radical identification with Uncle 
Peck. 
When Vogel substitutes an adult actress for the teenage L'il Bit, she creates a 
semiotic distancing that allows the audience easier access to their own and L'il 
Bit's emotional journeys. Ironically, however, for the substitution to work, the 
audience must transform the adult actress into a teenager and eventually into an 
eleven year old girl. The audience and not Vogel manufactures the image of an 
eroticized child being molested by a middle-aged man. The actor playing Peck on 
stage is actually fondling a consenting adult, but the audience is very deftly and 
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convincingly (a result of long practice) creating the child abuse, being horrified at 
it, and condemning it. In other words, the play succeeds as all good plays succeed: 
the audience is allowed to experience the transgression of limits and taboos they 
must avoid in real life. 
Difference disappears, Kristeva argues, the moment we admit our ability to 
transgress, when we lay bare the internal boundaries of our own strangeness instead 
of projecting them outward. "Strange indeed is the encounter with the other— 
whom we perceive by means of sight, hearing, smell, but do not 'frame' within our 
consciousness." 7 0 As a defensive strategy we tend to regard our hostilities as a 
product of the outside world, completely exterior to us, and as a result our experience 
of the world lacks authenticity. On the other hand, sensorial detail saturates Vogel's 
text. Her construction of L'il Bit is fascinating in that she has the unique ability to 
interiorize and evaluate what her senses feed her; she is profoundly connected to 
her senses, and by extension her immediate, physical world. The moment when 
L'il Bit lies on the hotel bed with Peck, "because sometimes the body knows things 
that the mind isn't listening t o , " 7 1 reveals her connection with him. The body 
indeed has a language of its own, as we recognize all the senses in the "Recipe for 
a Southern Boy:" hearing in the drawl and the whisper of the zipper, taste in the 
gumbo and Bay Rum, smell in the sweat of cypress and sand, e t c . 7 2 Although the 
senses (and the body) beg L'il Bit to enter further into an inappropriate relationship 
with Peck, they exemplify a deep connection that surpasses family ties, propriety, 
and even time, given that the scene transpires in L'il Bit's memory. Past and present, 
inside and outside collapse, the sense of doubling solidifies and yet dissipates, 
Peck is indeed framed within L'il Bit's consciousness, and the two for a moment 
are one. 
L'il Bit's identification with her uncle must be read as an empowering gesture. 
To interpret her reconciliation with her past as an annihilation of the self, or worse, 
as an excusing of the pedophile or an endorsement of pedophilia, is a great injustice 
to the text. The temptation to do so is testimony to the radical, and for some 
individuals disconcerting, power of forgiveness. To turn the other cheek is easier 
said than done. "To worry or to smile, such is the choice when we are assailed by 
the strange; our decision depends on how familiar we are with our ghosts." 7 3 L'il 
Bit accepts that she has been robbed of valuable years and valuable relationships; 
she even accepts that part of her may have been damaged beyond repair. Vogel 
seems to be dispelling the Utopian dream of a day in which all people are free of 
pain, suffering or cruelty, since no one can point to a life free of pain and loss. Pain 
and loss are constituent of life. The last image of the play illustrates that L'il Bit is 
aware that her past will always be with her. 
As L'il Bit adjusts the rearview mirror, a faint light strikes the 
spirit of Uncle Peck, who is sitting in the back seat of the car. 
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She sees him in the mirror. She smiles at him, and he nods at her. 
They are happy to be going for a long drive together. . . 7 4 
We are left to understand that L'il Bit accepts that the ghost of Uncle Peck will be 
going everywhere with her. But since she has come to exorcize and heal the demons 
of her past, the haunting is not malevolent. The victim does not have to wallow in 
a past of disappointment and bitterness; she may indeed choose happiness. Given 
the options, L'il Bit makes the most sensible choice, made possible only by daring 
to confront the spirit of Peck within her. 
How I Learned to Drive does not simply stage an ethics of love and non-
violence, it helps us understand why a practice of love and non-violence is so 
difficult, at times believed impossible. To forgive wrongs, especially those for 
which forgiveness is not sought, not only resists accepted and reasonable recourse 
to retribution and punishment, but it seems to indicate an acceptance of a loss of 
integrity, a loss of identity. Forgiveness not only defies rationality, it exists beyond 
comprehension. But as daily existence reminds us, our flimsy adherence to what 
we perceive as justice only guarantees us a tenuous peace, undergirded by tension 
and anxiety. Surely there is nothing really to lose were we to take that agonizing 
chance and embrace love and forgiveness beyond all hope of return. The rewards 
must be better. We have always hoped so. 
Post Script 
This article was written before 11 September 2001, and as it goes to press, 
the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal is garnering a great deal of media attention. 
Presently the United States has two incomprehensible others with whom it must 
somehow learn to cope and deal constructively: the Middle Eastern Muslims who 
view the West with disapprobation and violence, and the sexually conflicted Catholic 
clergy. I propose that the argument of this essay applies to both cases. 
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